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1 Introduction
The recent global ﬁnancial crisis highlighted the importance of managing vulnerabilities
in the mortgage market. House price falls, income shocks and unemployment spells for
households who initiated mortgage loans during periods of relatively loose credit conditions
have all been documented as playing a causal role in the post 2007 period of ﬁnancial
instability (Gerardi et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2008; Duca et al., 2011). Ensuring households
have suﬃcient buﬀers to withstand economic shocks is the cornerstone of new ﬁnancial
stability measures adopted since the ﬁnancial crisis such as bank stress testing and the
adoption of macroprudential limits on borrower leverage (Claessens, 2014; Kashyap et al.,
2011; Cerutti et al., 2017; Duca et al., 2010).
In this context, considerable work has been undertaken to determine the drivers of
mortgage default since the ﬁnancial crisis in the US and Europe. Much of this research
has drawn on the increasing access to loan-level data available since the onset of the
ﬁnancial crisis. The research generally ﬁnds that defaults are triggered by unemployment
shocks and house price declines (Elul et al., 2010; Kelly and O'Malley, 2016; Mayer et
al., 2009; Gyourko and Tracy, 2014; Schelkle, 2018) and are exacerbated by the quality
of underwriting practices at point of loan origination (Anderson et al., 2011; Jiang et al.,
2013, 2014). Additionally, recent research has put forward a range of economy-wide stress
testing approaches to model the impact of systemic shocks to housing and labour markets
on mortgage default (Simons and Rolwes, 2009; Vazquez et al., 2012; Borio et al., 2014).
While providing a considerable contribution to the recent literature, a limitation of
loan-level datasets is that they typically do not contain information on current aﬀordability,
in particular the current income of the household. This presents an important omitted
variable which may bias estimates. By not having information on income and, hence, the
current debt service ratio (DSR), the ratio of the current payment to net monthly income,
many of these studies are not able to capture the impact of this aspect of aﬀordability
shocks on mortgage default. In dealing with the absence of current information on income,
a number of studies rely on regional level unemployment data, or income information at
the point of loan origination as a best approximation to the current income position.
Furthermore, much of the literature on mortgage default has focused on labour market
channels, with the impact of interest rate changes receiving less attention. However, po-
tential interest rate shocks are of critical importance at present given the historically low
period of global policy rates experienced internationally post 2007/08. The low interest
rate environment has provided a considerable beneﬁt to mortgage holders where reduc-
tions in interest rates have been passed through to households, thereby reducing payment
burdens. Nonetheless, as the global economy has begun to recover, and inﬂation begins to
move towards target levels, pressure will inevitably build on Central Banks to normalise the
policy environment. Indeed, the Federal Reserve and Bank of England have already begun
the process of raising rates while the ECB has begun to unwind extraordinary measures
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and indicated policy rate normalisation is on the horizon.1 This will pose an aﬀordability
risk to the many mortgage holders who are exposed to increases in rates. Two recent pa-
pers do focus on the aﬀordability channel of mortgage default by assessing the interest rate
(payment) and income channels (Fuster and Willen, 2017; Byrne et al., 2017). However, no
study to date has linked the current debt service ratio to mortgage default using household
panel data and attempted to stress test the market to the eﬀects of monetary policy rate
changes.
To address this gap in the literature, in this paper we use data from the Irish Survey of
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) over the period 2004-2016 to estimate a discrete time
logit survival model of mortgage arrears. Our survey data contain information on default,
current income and current repayment as well as a range of other household characteristics
which are unavailable in many loan-level datasets. Crucially, the model allows arrears to
be determined by the current debt service ratio. We allow the debt-service ratio to impact
households both in level terms, to capture the degree of indebtedness, as well as in changes
to capture shocks to income or interest rates.
The beneﬁt of this approach is that it allows us to test the impact of both labour market
changes and interest rate eﬀects on default. Furthermore, it then provides us with a stress
testing framework at the household level to explore the implications of a series of interest
rate rises for mortgaged households. Using the empirical estimates from this model, we
examine the impact of a series of interest rate rises, ranging from a moderate 25 basis points
to 100 basis points, on the predicted one year probability of arrears for Irish households.
Finally, we explore the distributional consequences of changes in interest rate by examining
the diﬀerent sensitivity to mortgage arrears across the socio-economic characteristics of
households. These impacts provide important insights into our understanding of both
how to model the eﬀects of an interest rate increase for stress testing purposes, and the
heterogeneous impacts of policy developments across the economy.
Our paper, therefore, makes a threefold contribution to the literature. First, we com-
plement the recent research on labour market shocks and default by directly linking arrears
to the current debt service ratio. We allow the debt service ratio to impact arrears both
in terms of the levels of the ratio, to capture the impacts of indebtedness, and the change
in the ratio to capture shocks to the repayment capacity of the household. Second, we
contribute to the literature on the interest rate eﬀects on mortgage default by linking re-
payment directly with the ability to pay in a panel data setting. Third, we complement the
recent macro research on testing the impact of monetary policy on ﬁnancial stability, and
the literature on stress testing mortgage markets to interest rate changes, by exploring how
interest rate normalisation by the ECB, would impact mortgage arrears at the household
level.
A number of papers are close to our research. First, in relation to the literature on the
use of current income and mortgage arrears, Gerardi et al. (2017) use US data to test the
1Speech by Peter Praet, Chief Economist ECB, available
at:http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180606.en.html
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ability to pay channel. Our research builds on this study by separately allowing a level
eﬀect and a shock eﬀect of the current debt service ratio on arrears. Mocetti and Viviano
(2017) test the impact of current income on mortgage default using Italian administrative
data, but their study does not have information on the level of repayment, which is also
absent in Aller and Grant (2018). Our paper also contributes to the broader US and
European literature on the impact of unemployment on arrears, by exploiting information
on the current employment status of the head of household, rather than the standard
approach of using regional unemployment data as a proxy, as critiqued in Gyourko and
Tracy (2014) and Schelkle (2018).
Second, in a similar manner to the research on labour market shocks, our paper con-
tributes to the literature that identiﬁes the impact of interest rates or repayment levels
on default by dealing with the omitted variable bias due to the absence of information on
current income levels. These data are absent from Fuster and Willen (2017), Byrne et al.
(2017), and certain studies testing the impact of mortgage modiﬁcations on default risk
(Tracy and Wright, 2016). By considering the link between monetary policy normalisation
and default, we also complement the research which explores the link between monetary
policy and ﬁnancial stability (Smets, 2014; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014) by providing
a direct micro-data example of one of the interest rate channels.
Finally, by developing a micro-level stress testing tool which can explore the impact of
interest rate shocks on arrears at the household level, our research complements the existing
macro-level stress testing models of default (Piﬀer, 2018; Borio et al., 2014; Simons and
Rolwes, 2009; Vazquez et al., 2012; Buncic and Meleck, 2013). Using aggregate data,
Drehmann and Juselius (2012) show the importance of the debt service ratio as a predictor
of systemic banking crises. By modelling the debt service ratio at a household level, we
are able to explore the distributional impact of higher interest rates across households.
Assessing the impact of monetary policy normalisation in the Irish mortgage market
is of particular interest. First, due to the severity of its mortgage arrears crisis and the
highly indebted nature of the Irish domestic economy; the credit boom observed during
the latter stages of the Celtic Tiger saw underwriting practices in the banking sector
loosened considerably, which led to an unsustainable extension of credit to households who
borrowed large volumes of credit at high loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios (McCarthy
and McQuinn, 2017). When the Irish economy was particularly impacted by the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008/09, resulting in house price declines and sharp increases in unemployment
many households had few buﬀers with which to absorb these shocks. This led to a wave
of defaults that have adversely impacted the household and ﬁnancial sector since. At the
peak of the arrears crisis in 2013, one ﬁfth of Irish mortgages were in default.
Second, despite, or maybe because of the relatively large impact of the international
crisis, the Irish economy has, since 2013, recovered in a spectacular fashion. However, while
the overall economy has enjoyed growth rates at least double the European average since
2013, vulnerabilities remain in the Irish mortgage market. Irish private sector debt, as a
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ratio of GDP2, is still one of the highest levels across the Euro area. Vulnerabilities are also
accentuated by the structure of the domestic mortgage market which has a large number
of contracts on variable rates. In 2013 85 per cent of mortgage loans in Ireland were on
variable rates, compared to less than 10 per cent in France and Belgium and less than one
quarter in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015).
The high proportion of variable rate mortgages, and the high level of indebtedness, means
that Irish households are particularly vulnerable to a rise in interest rates.
The key ﬁndings of this paper can be summarised as follows. We ﬁnd a household's
repayment capacity, measured by the current debt service ratio, to be a major determinant
of mortgage arrears. Both the level of the debt service ratio, as well as the change in the
debt service ratio are found to have strong impacts on arrears. These ﬁndings are important
as they indicate that it is not only the size of the shock that matters but also the level of
indebtedness of households when the shock occurs.
In terms of scenario analysis, we show that increases in the euro area policy rate leads to
increases in the arrears rate, but that the severity of the shock depends on the magnitude
of the rise in a non-linear way. Initially we stress the interest rates for all households.
However, we then allow for diﬀerent pass-through relationships between the policy rate
and the individual household mortgage rate. There are two main variable rate contract
types in Ireland: standard variable rates (SVRs) whose level is set at the discretion of
the bank but normally follows the policy rate; and tracker rates which have a ﬁxed
contractual mark-up over a reference rate. To capture these diﬀerences, we undertake a
scenario that assumes a zero pass-through for those mortgages secured at ﬁxed rates, a
partial pass-through for households on a standard variable rate (SVR) and full pass-through
for so-called tracker mortgages.
With diﬀerential pass through by interest rate type, our estimates of the percentage
point increase in the arrears ﬂow of Irish mortgages range from 0.1 percentage points for a
25 basis points shock, to 0.2 for a 50 basis points rise and 0.5 percentage points for a 100
basis points shock. These represent between a 4 per cent and 18 per cent increase in the
ﬂow of mortgages into arrears. The relative variance in the estimates reﬂects the non-linear
nature of the impact of interest rates as well as the uncertainty about the sensitivity of
lending rates to changes in the policy rate for non-tracker borrowers.
As our scenarios are partial equilibrium in nature, an interesting question arises as to
whether the increase in incomes due to a growing economy would oﬀset the higher interest
rates. To address this issue, we obtain an estimate of the long term growth rate in Irish
income levels, adjusted for the general equilibrium eﬀects of higher interest rates. This
is achieved with a structural macroeconomic model of the Irish economy (Bergin et al.,
2017). We then examine to what extent the increase in income levels would oﬀset the
reduction in aﬀordability of the higher interest rates. We ﬁnd that even fairly substantial
income growth would not fully oﬀset the eﬀects of interest rate rises on Irish mortgage
2At the end of 2017, this ratio was 260 per cent, whereas the EU Commission has set an
indicative threshold of 160 per cent for member countries.
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holders. This is because the increase in the mortgage payment due to an interest rate
shock would signiﬁcantly outweigh the impact of income growth for households. Overall,
notwithstanding the strong expected growth path of the Irish economy, the debt service
ratio for many households would still deteriorate.
Finally, we explore the heterogeneity of these results across household types. Our
ﬁndings show that in particular young households, low income households and those early in
the loan age distribution are most at risk of falling into arrears on their mortgage payments
as a result of a rise in interest rates. These ﬁndings highlight the precarious nature of
repayment burdens for non-ﬁxed rate borrowers and suggest a number of implications for
policy. Fixing interest rates may be appropriate for certain at risk groups, particularly
younger households. Expanding the share of ﬁxed rate loans in the Irish market, and the
length of the ﬁxed term could therefore help to minimise the risk confronting those groups
most exposed to interest rate shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of both the
Irish mortgage arrears crisis and monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis. Section 3
introduces the data and methodology used in the analysis, while Section 4 presents the
empirical results and tests the performance of the model. In Section 5 we test the sensitivity
of households' repayment capacity to a series of interest rate shock scenarios. Section 6
summarises our ﬁndings and discusses policy implications.
2 Mortgage Arrears and the Irish Crisis
Following the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in Ireland in 2008, the mortgage market expe-
rienced a rapid deterioration in loan performance. During the latter stages of the Celtic
Tiger, underwriting practices in the banking sector loosened markedly and households
borrowed large volumes of credit at high loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios. Mort-
gage terms also lengthened on average which reduced the eﬀective repayment burdens.
McCarthy and McQuinn (2017) document the loosening of Irish credit conditions for house-
holds, noting in particular the more liberal lending channel in relation to incomes.
The extension of loans at loose credit conditions left households with few buﬀers avail-
able to withstand shocks once the banking crisis began to propagate through the real
economy. Figure 1 presents the trend in mortgage arrears, unemployment, house prices
and interest rates from just prior to the crisis in 2005 to end-2017. The data on mort-
gage defaults relate to mortgages collateralised on owner-occupied principal dwelling home
(PDH) properties. Default in this market increased from below 1 per cent of loans in 2007
to peak at 13 per cent of loans in 20133. The scale of the shock to the labour market was
just as stark; the unemployment rate increased from under 5 per cent in 2007 to 16 per
3These ﬁgures relate to mortgage accounts greater than 90 days past due on their obligations
which is the standard Basel deﬁnition of loan delinquency. This diﬀers from our deﬁnition of
arrears in the SILC survey micro data which relates to any missed payments. Some diﬀerences in
magnitude for aggregate charts may therefore be evident.
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cent at the height of the bust in 2012. Real incomes also fell markedly in each year from
2009 to 2013 (CSO SILC data).
Figure 1: Mortgage Default Backdrop Ireland
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The correction in house prices was even more dramatic; from the peak in Q2 2007 to
the trough in Q2 2013, prices fell by 55 per cent on a nominal basis. This led to a large
share of households experiencing negative equity. Thus, the Irish mortgage market after
the crash, saw borrowers hit simultaneously with severe aﬀordability (unemployment and
falling incomes) and equity shocks (house prices reversals). Indeed, Fahy et al. (2018)
show a change in the type of households experiencing arrears before and after the crisis,
highlighting the systemic nature of the shock. More recently mortgage arrears have begun
to decline, in part driven by the economic recovery but also driven by an extensive pro-
gramme of mortgage modiﬁcation which has attempted to provide sustainable solutions
for borrowers looking to engage with banks to resolve their mortgage diﬃculties. McCann
(2017) and Donnery et al. (2018) document the steps taken to resolve the Irish mortgage
crisis including the extensive programmes of mortgage resolution.
A large body of research has explored the determinants of mortgage arrears since
the Irish crisis, with a particular emphasis on disentangling the relative magnitude of
the aﬀordability and equity shocks. An early study using EU SILC data up to 2009 by
McCarthy and McQuinn (2011) explored a range of scenarios examining the implications for
6
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Irish mortgage aﬀordability of an interest rate shock. They deﬁne the mortgage repayment
to income ratio (MRTI) and examine the distributional implications for Irish mortgaged
households of an increase in interest rates. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that an increase
in the variable mortgage rate of 150 basis points results in a 26 per cent increase in the
number of households in the top decile range of the MRTI (30 to 80 per cent) for that year.
A decline of the same magnitude, on the other hand, results in a 35 per cent reduction in
those in the same range. While this study was informative, it was completed at a time
which pre-dated the worst years of the crisis and an updated study which formally models
arrears as a function of aﬀordability complements and updates this research.
Lydon and McCarthy (2013) use 2010 loan level data to examine the eﬀect of both
equity and income shocks on arrears. They ﬁnd a considerable role for both channels,
but as their loan level data do not contain current income or labour market status, they
capture income shocks by using regional unemployment rates as a proxy for income shocks.
As part of the stress testing framework developed by the Central Bank of Ireland,
a range of research papers focused on determining the drivers of mortgage default using
transition models. Kelly (2011), and subsequently Kelly and O'Malley (2016), present a
transition matrix model of the Irish mortgage market which determines ﬂows into arrears
as a function of unemployment, loan-to-value ratios and other loan and dwelling charac-
teristics. This research has subsequently been outlined further in Gaﬀney et al. (2014b),
Gaﬀney et al. (2014a) and applied to the UK mortgage market by McCann (2014). This
research is critically important to understanding the development in mortgage arrears in an
Irish case. They formed the basis for the ongoing stress testing and ﬁnancial vulnerability
analysis that are undertaken in the Irish mortgage market. They were also used in the
Prudential Capital Adequacy Review (PCAR) process which assessed the recapitalisation
requirements of the Irish banks after the economic crisis. These models ﬁnd a large eﬀect
of loan-to-value and unemployment on arrears. Other factors have also aﬀected the default
rate in Ireland. O'Malley (2018) uses a judicial ruling to also highlight the impact of the
removal of repossession risk on the Irish default rate following the crisis. As these papers
rely on loan-level data they do not have access to up-to-date information on household
income which we explore in this paper.
One paper which does bridge the gap between loan-level data and current information
on income is McCarthy (2014) which uses survey data appended to the Central Bank
of Ireland loan level data. It combines the results of an income survey (see McCarthy
and McQuinn (2017) for details) of Irish mortgaged households conducted in 2012 with
information on the corresponding loan level data for the same households. This research
ﬁnds an important role for income volatility and labour market shocks in explaining default
activity. Our research builds on this paper by estimating the impact on arrears of current
income aﬀordability using a panel setting.
While mortgage arrears in Ireland have fallen in recent quarters, continued vulnera-
bilities remain given the indebted nature of many households. Indeed, an inevitable risk
for the domestic economy are the implications of future Euro area policy rate increases.
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The interest rate on the main reﬁnancing operations (MRO), which provides the bulk of
liquidity to the banking system has, since 2009, been kept at historically low rates as a
response to the international ﬁnancial crisis. As evidence of economic recovery gathers
throughout Europe, the highly accommodative nature of Euro area monetary policy is
unlikely to last past the short to medium-term. ECB policy makers have recently pointed
towards a gradual removal of the extraordinary monetary accommodation and a potential
normalisation of policy rates.4 Therefore, as the signiﬁcance of the debt service ratio in
inﬂuencing Irish mortgage arrears demonstrates, the sensitivity of Irish mortgage holders
to interest rate changes is a signiﬁcant policy concern.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
SILC provides a comprehensive micro-level dataset surveying income and living conditions
across diﬀerent types of households. As a survey of private households, it is voluntary
and is carried out under EU legislation. In Ireland, the survey is conducted on an annual
basis by the CSO and, while it is primarily focused on collecting information used to derive
indicators of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, the survey also contains a signiﬁcant
amount of information for each individual on home ownership, details of mortgage debt,
monthly mortgage instalments and arrears. The data do not capture information on the
balances outstanding for equity releases or top-ups so households who hold such products
may have their debt balances underestimated by SILC.5
A key attraction in using SILC to examine the issue of household mortgage stress is the
availability of timely economic data for the household. Much of the literature on mortgage
arrears indicates aﬀordability issues such as declines in household disposable income and
or shocks to the employment status of household members are key determinants. However,
the majority of studies used to examine the issue of arrears use loan level administra-
tive data usually compiled by Central Banks and or Regulatory authorities. While these
data have accurate and timely information on the nature of the loan, they rarely have
timely information on the household's current economic status. The only economic data
such datasets typically have is income and employment information at the time of loan
origination. However, in a labour market such as Ireland's, where unemployment rapidly
increased from just over 5 per cent in at the start of 2008 to just under 16 per cent in
mid-2010, such information can very quickly become outdated. As mentioned in the pre-
vious section, McCarthy (2014) sought to address this using survey data appended to CBI
loan-level data. However, owing to the one-oﬀ nature of the survey, this information was
4Speech by Peter Praet, Chief Economist ECB, available
at:http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180606.en.html
5As we cannot capture data on these products, any shocks and scenarios that we calculate using
these data cannot take this debt into account. Our estimates only provide shocks based on the
primary dwelling mortgage.
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only available on a one year, cross-sectional basis.
Figure 2: Comparison of SILC and CBI Arrears Data
0
5
10
15
20
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 A
rr
ea
rs
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
SILC CBI
CBI data refer to the % of PDH loans that are in arrears (of any length). We report the average
across 4 quarters. In SILC households are asked to report if they have failed to make a mortgage
payment on their principal dwelling home in the last 12 months. The correlation coeﬃcient is
0.88.
Figure 2 plots a comparison between the percentage of Irish households in mortgage
arrears in SILC6 and the percentage of PDH loans in arrears of any length from the Central
Bank of Ireland (CBI) loan level dataset7. While the CBI loan level data are only available
from 2009 onwards, for the period 2009-2016 there is a 88 per cent correlation between
the two datasets, allaying concerns of under-representation of households in arrears in this
instance. Figure 2 also highlights the scale of the mortgage arrears crisis in Ireland.
In Figure 3a we plot the mean current mortgage loan to value (CLTV) ratio between
2004 and 2016. It shows that in our sample, household mortgage debt relative to the value
of the property increased hugely from 30 per cent in 2005 to a peak of 80 per cent in 2013,
coinciding with the sharp decline in house prices. In Figure 3b we see the corresponding
increase in households in negative equity, with virtually no households in negative equity
up until 2008 and a sharp increase thereafter, peaking at just over 30 per cent of households
in 2013.
Figure 4 documents the rise in the average household Debt Service Ratio (DSR), with
the proportion of income spent on mortgage instalments increasing from 14 per cent in
6In SILC respondents were asked whether In the last 12 months, did it happen that the
household was unable to make a mortgage repayment for the main dwelling on time, due to
ﬁnancial diﬃculties?. The analysis in this paper therefore only focuses on the primary dwelling
home arrears and not on the buy to let or second homes markets.
7CBI loan level data contain data for the ﬁve largest mortgage lenders in Ireland, covering
approximately 90% of the PDH market in 2015.
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Figure 3: CLTV and Negative Equity 2004-2016
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2004 to approximately 20 per cent in 2010 and remaining at a similar level through to
2014 before beginning to decrease. Taking Figures 2-4 together, it is clear that the huge
increase in households falling into arrears on their mortgage payments coincided with both
the deterioration in housing equity and the increase in the repayment burden faced by
households. We will test these channels empirically in the next section.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for the key demographic (top panel) and mort-
gage variables (bottom panel) of households in our sample. Beginning with demographic
variables, we see that mortgaged households are likely to be employed, married, between
36-50 years of age and with either secondary or tertiary level education. With regards to
household formation, approximately 90 per cent of the sample is composed of households
with at least two adults, and three quarters of the sample belong to the top 40 per cent
of the income distribution. From the bottom panel of Table 1 we see that on average
households in our sample pay e835 per month on their mortgage repayments and have
10
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e140,886 outstanding on their mortgage loan.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 2004-2016
Share of Households
Marital Status
Married 0.71
Single 0.18
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 0.11
Age Group
18-35 0.26
36-50 0.55
51+ 0.19
Employment Status
Employed 0.78
Unemployed 0.04
Other 0.18
Education
Primary 0.06
Secondary 0.42
Tertiary 0.52
Household Composition
1 adult, no children 0.10
1 adult, with children 0.02
2+ adults, no children 0.33
2+ adults, with children 0.55
Income Distribution
Q1 0.02
Q2 0.06
Q3 0.16
Q4 0.32
Q5 0.43
Region
BMW 0.22
Dublin 0.33
ME MW SE SW 0.44
Mortgage and Economic Indicators
Original Loan (e) 156248.60
Outstanding Principal (e) 140886.40
Monthly Payment (e) 835.33
Mortgage Term (Years) 25
Debt Service Ratio 0.19
Change in DSR -0.00097
Current Loan to Value Ratio 0.54
CLTV < 80 0.74
CLTV 80− 100 0.10
CLTV > 100 0.16
Negative Equity 0.14
Arrears 0.09
Real Disposable Income (e) 59164.70
Ln(real disposable income) 10.88
Regional Macro Controls
Unemployment 0.1
GVA growth 0.06
GDPpc (e) 42513.39
Ln(GDPpc) 10.59
No. Obs 4749
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3.2 Methodology
In determining the drivers of mortgage default, the standard literature suggests two key
triggers; equity shocks and aﬀordability shocks. An important contribution of this research
is to measure aﬀordability shocks using the current debt servicing capacity of the household
as measured by the current debt service ratio (DSR) and changes in the debt service ratio.
To test the impact of these variables on mortgage arrears we therefore estimate two
speciﬁc models: 1) a standard logit model on the stock of mortgage arrears; and 2) a
discrete time survival model on the ﬂow of mortgages into arrears using a logit speciﬁcation.
We exploit the panel nature of our dataset to deal with a number of econometric concerns
such as simultaneity and the determinants of arrears transitions in the ﬂows model. To
begin, the following speciﬁcation is presented for the arrears stock:
Pr(Dit = 1) = f(∆DSRit, DSRit−1, CLTVit−1, lnYit−1, EmpStatusit,Xit,Zrt−1) (1)
where Dit is the censored underlying latent propensity to delinquency for household
mortgage i in period t as is common in the existing literature (Jiang et al., 2013, 2014;
Haughwout et al., 2008). The DSR enters the baseline speciﬁcation as a lagged level. As in
Elul et al. (2010), the CLTV enters as a series of dummy variables: households with CLTV
less than 80, households with a CLTV between 80 and 100 and households with negative
equity (CLTV greater than 100). This allows for the fact that equity shocks should only
really determine arrears once the borrower moves into negative equity and the underlying
put value of the default option that any mortgage holder has moved into the money
i.e. when the value of the house is worth less than the underlying collateralised loan, the
borrower has negative net worth and discontinues repayments. We include these indicators
with a one period lag to remove any possible simultaneity bias.
In addition to the DSR as a control for current aﬀordability, we exploit the richness in
the economic variables in our survey by also including the log level of income lnYit−1 and
indicator variables for those households who are unemployed or not in the workforce in the
vector EmpStatusit. These controls are important as they capture aspects of aﬀordability
over and above the debt service ratio. Controlling for income as a covariate as well as the
debt service ratio ensures that the DSR coeﬃcient captures the variation in indebtedness
across households, the sensitivity to repayment shocks and the relative aﬀordability of
the current payment for a given income level. Also including a dummy for unemployed
households ensures that those households who face a large shock event are separately
controlled for. We feel the suite of aﬀordability indicators leads to a saturated speciﬁcation
and ensures that any debt service ratio eﬀect we ﬁnd is robust and correctly captures the
repayment burden.
Finally, and most critically, we include in our speciﬁcation the change in the debt-
service ratio ∆DSRit to capture the channel through which households would be exposed
to shocks to their mortgage payment or changes in their after tax income. This is the
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critical channel when trying to understand the impact of policy rate rises on arrears, as
changes in the household's ability to repay are due to variations in the current aﬀordability
of the loan. We therefore include in our speciﬁcations the ∆DSRit as well as the level of
the DSR in the previous period to ensure we account for the size of the shock as well as
the starting level of the repayment burden. These aspects have not to date been explored
in the literature.
To further saturate our speciﬁcation, we include a vector of household characteristics
which include the age of the household head, education, martial status and household com-
position. To capture macroeconomic time varying eﬀects, we include the NUTS3 regional
unemployment rate, change in gross value added, and gross value added per capita. These
controls capture macroeconomic variation and business cycle ﬂuctuations at the regional
level. This is in line with existing research in this area (McCann, 2017; Kelly and O'Malley,
2016). These factors are included with a lag to avoid simultaneity bias. In the robustness
checks, we remove these factors and instead include region year ﬁxed eﬀects.
For the arrears ﬂows model, we are able to estimate a survival model on the transitions
into arrears. In this model, the dependent variable Dfit takes the value of 1 if a household
ﬁrst missed a payment within that period. Only incidents where households are observed
to transition over time from a non-delinquent to delinquent state are used in the analysis.
For households with a transition but then a number of years of arrears following this point,
they are marked as having experienced a delinquency after the ﬁrst year of missed payments
with subsequent observations omitted.
Given the annual nature of our data, we estimate the discrete time version of the
standard hazard model. We use the common logistic speciﬁcation of the discrete time
hazard function for household i at time t, h((G))it, as in Jenkins (1995):
h((G))it =
1
[1 + exp(−λ(t)− βG)] (2)
which the survival function in log format simpliﬁes for speciﬁcation purposes to:
log(
hit
1− hit) = λ(t) + βG (3)
The vector, G, contains all the controls speciﬁed earlier in equation 1 including the
DSR, income, household controls and the time-region varying macroeconomic factors. An
important aspect for such discrete time models is the choice of the functional form for time,
λ(t). This is complicated in our setting as our mortgages originated in diﬀerent years and
the latent exposure to risk diﬀers across households and time periods (left truncation). To
deal with this issue, we follow Kelly et al. (2015) who specify the functional form for time
as a polynomial of the loan vintage (the number of years since the loan was originated).
We therefore append this variable to equation 3. Previous literature on mortgage default
and the time of exposure at risk would suggest that the vintage controls should follow a
hump shape with the default risk high in the early years of the loan and then declining
through the term (Haughwout et al., 2008).
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log(
hit
1− hit) = α1vit + α2v
2
it + βG (4)
In terms of the key parameters in our baseline speciﬁcation for either the stocks model
or the survival model, we would expect that the probability of arrears is increasing in
the debt service ratio (both in levels and in shocks). These expectations are outlined in
Table 2.
Table 2: A-Priori Parameter Expectations
β∆DSR > 0
β(DSR) > 0
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Baseline Empirical Findings
In Table 3 we present the results from estimating the baseline mortgage arrears (Stocks) and
discrete time survival model of transitions into mortgage arrears (Flows) models outlined in
Section 3.2. We report average marginal eﬀects from logit regressions with standard errors
in parentheses. All regressions reported in Table 3 control for household characteristics,
loan vintage and regional macroeconomic controls. In columns 1 and 2 we ﬁrst focus purely
on the housing equity channel by including indicator variables for three bands of the current
loan to value ratio (CLTV). We only ﬁnd a positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
arrears rate in our stocks speciﬁcation for households with a CLTV>100 i.e. households
in negative equity. This would indicate that it is not a higher level of the loan to value
ratio per se that is important in determining arrears, but rather, whether a household is
in negative equity or not.
In columns 3 and 4 we instead include the ﬁrst component of the aﬀordability channel:
employment status.8 Being unemployed is unsurprisingly associated with a higher proba-
bility of arrears and this holds in both the stocks and ﬂows speciﬁcations. Columns 5 and
6 include disposable household income and show that higher incomes are associated with a
lower probability of arrears. In columns 7 and 8 we include the CLTV indicators, employ-
ment status and household income jointly and the coeﬃcient estimates and signiﬁcance
levels remain similar.
In columns 9 and 10 we add the household's Debt Service Ratio (DSR) as our main
measure of household repayment capacity. The positive, statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
in our stocks speciﬁcation indicates that households who pay a higher proportion of their
8Our employment status refers to the household head.
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Table 3: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows
Regional Macro Variables
L.Unemployment Rate 1.002∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.142) (0.161) (0.139) (0.164) (0.136) (0.165) (0.144) (0.168) (0.146) (0.170) (0.148)
L.GVA Growth -0.0990* -0.124∗∗ -0.0152 -0.0986∗∗ -0.104∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.0579) (0.0505) (0.0529) (0.0454) (0.0582) (0.0496) (0.0555) (0.0473) (0.0555) (0.0474) (0.0554) (0.0474)
L.Log GDP per capita 0.0822 0.0904∗ 0.0483 0.0763 0.0925 0.0897∗ 0.0875 0.0864∗ 0.0778 0.0805 0.0769 0.0785
(0.0630) (0.0529) (0.0580) (0.0501) (0.0607) (0.0524) (0.0587) (0.0502) (0.0589) (0.0502) (0.0597) (0.0509)
LTV Channel
L.CLTV < 80 (Base Group) - - - - - - - -
L.CLTV 80− 100 0.0207 0.00303 0.0233 0.00316 0.0179 0.00144 0.0173 0.00204
(0.0195) (0.0137) (0.0185) (0.0131) (0.0179) (0.0128) (0.0179) (0.0129)
L.CLTV > 100 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0161 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.0188 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0141 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0185) (0.0116) (0.0175) (0.0118) (0.0175) (0.0113) (0.0171) (0.0113)
Aﬀordability Channel
Employed (Base Group) - - - - - - - -
Unemployed 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗
(0.0383) (0.0374) (0.0356) (0.0365) (0.0357) (0.0372) (0.0316) (0.0308)
Other 0.0864∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0252∗ 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0248∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0211
(0.0175) (0.0136) (0.0182) (0.0150) (0.0182) (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0141)
L.Log Real HH Income -0.0903∗∗∗ -0.0272∗∗∗ -0.0657∗∗∗ -0.0165 -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.00909 -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0124
(0.0116) (0.00856) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.0139) (0.0104) (0.0137) (0.0103)
L.Debt Service Ratio 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0569 0.233∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0369) (0.0485) (0.0387)
∆ Debt Service Ratio 0.239∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0475)
Loan Vintage Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239
Mortgage arrears is deﬁned as being unable to make a mortgage repayment in the last 12 months, due to ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. Loan vintage is deﬁned as years since mortgage origination. Household characteristics: Age, Marital
Status, Education, Household Composition, Region. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level
displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
income on mortgage payments are associated with higher levels of mortgage arrears. How-
ever, as we are interested in identifying the role that income shocks play in mortgage
arrears, we are interested not only in the level of indebtedness, but also in the change in
the debt servicing requirement. Although in many cases our employment status indicator
will capture the eﬀects of a severe income shock from becoming unemployed, there is evi-
dence that in Ireland during the crisis that incomes declined even for those who remained
in employment. In columns 11 and 12 of Table 3 we therefore include both the lagged level
and the change in the DSR in the same speciﬁcation. Both the level and the shock to the
DSR are highly statistically signiﬁcant in both the stocks and ﬂows models. In the ﬂows
model, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on ∆DSR is slightly larger than the level eﬀect,
while the magnitudes of the two coeﬃcients are virtually identical in the stocks model.
4.2 Do We Find A Double Trigger?
The analysis in this section is motivated by the double-trigger theory of mortgage default,
discussed in Foote et al. (2008) amongst others, which states that it is the combination
of an income shock and negative equity which leads to default; the borrower runs out of
liquid ﬁnancial resources and is unable to either continue making mortgage payments or
to sell the property and pay oﬀ the outstanding mortgage debt. As we are particularly
concerned with the implications of monetary policy shocks, it is also important to examine
whether equity shocks attenuate repayment shocks as this would aﬀect the pass through
of monetary policy rate changes.
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Figure 5: The Impact of Debt Service Ratio Shocks on Arrears by Housing Equity
Status
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In Figure 5 we present the marginal eﬀects of arrears at discrete values of the repayment
capacity shock, ∆DSR, by housing equity status. We ﬁnd no evidence of the presence of
a double trigger in either our stocks or ﬂows speciﬁcations, which means that we ﬁnd no
evidence that for CLTV>100, increases in the debt service ratio have more pronounced
eﬀects on delinquency. However, it is important to note that one limitation of our data
is that our measure of housing equity is based on the level of the CLTV ratio being
greater than 100. Ideally, in order to test the presence of a double-trigger, we would
model transitions into negative equity, particularly in our ﬂows speciﬁcation which models
the determinants of delinquency at the point where households transition into arrears.
Unfortunately we do not have a suﬃcient number of observations in our data to allow us
to model the transition into negative equity. This limitation could potentially provide an
explanation for why we ﬁnd no evidence of a double-trigger. In the analysis from this point,
we model arrears on the basis of two dual, but independent, triggers (i.e. no interaction
between equity and aﬀordability shocks).
4.3 Testing the Model's Performance
As we noted in Section 2, despite the fall in mortgage arrears amongst Irish households
in recent quarters, likely increases in Euro area policy rates will inevitably put pressure
on mortgage holders which may exacerbate continued vulnerabilities due to the highly
leveraged nature of Irish households by international standards. Before we use the model
developed in Section 4.1 to stress test the impact of potential policy rate rises on Irish
households, it is important to test the model's performance.
In Table 4 we report the key variables of interest from our benchmark stocks and ﬂows
models presented in columns 11 and 12 of Table 3. In addition, we report two standard
measures of model performance, the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve and the percentage of correctly classiﬁed predictions. In Figure 6 we present
the ROC curves graphically. ROC curves present the trade-oﬀ between sensitivity (the true
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positive rate) and speciﬁcity (the false positive rate) and the closer the curve is to the top
and left hand axes, the better the model's performance. From Table 4 we also see that the
stocks and ﬂows models correctly classify 91 and 96 per cent of households respectively.
Both of these measures indicate that our models are reasonable at correctly classifying
which households are and are not in mortgage arrears. We are therefore satisﬁed that the
model is suitable to use for the stress testing exercises that we conduct in Section 5.
Table 4: Testing the Model
(1) (2)
Stocks Flows
LTV Channel
L.CLTV < 80 (Base Group) - -
L.CLTV 80 − 100 0.0173 0.00204
(0.0179) (0.0129)
L.CLTV > 100 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0171) (0.0113)
Aﬀordability Channel
L.Debt Service Ratio 0.233∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0387)
∆ Debt Service Ratio 0.239∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0475)
Area under ROC Curve 0.8097 0.766
% correctly classiﬁed 91.66 96.25
Observations 4,749 4,239
Figure 6: Testing Model Performance - ROC Curves
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4.4 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform a number of robustness checks to ensure that our ﬁndings are
robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the model. In Table 5 we explore alternative ways
of modelling the LTV channel. In our baseline speciﬁcations, repeated for convenience in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we model the LTV channel using three buckets: CLTV<80,
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CLTV 80-100 and CLTV>100. Instead, in columns 3 and 4 we model the LTV contin-
uously and show that the coeﬃcients are similar to those for CLTV>100 in the baseline
speciﬁcation. In addition to the level of the LTV, in columns 5 and 6 we also test whether
the change in the LTV is a key determinant of arrears. The coeﬃcient on ∆CLTV is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in the stocks model. Finally, in columns 7 and 8 we include a dummy
variable for a household being in negative equity, in addition to the continuous CLTV and
∆CLTV measures. We ﬁnd no additional eﬀect on the negative equity dummy having
already controlled for the continuous LTV and ∆LTV measures. These alternative ways
of modelling the LTV channel have no impact on the estimates of our key aﬀordability
variables, the DSR and ∆DSR, reported in each of columns 3-8.
Table 5: Modelling the LTV Channel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows
L.CLTV < 80 (Base Group) - - - - - - - -
L.CLTV 80− 100 0.0173 0.00204
(0.0179) (0.0129)
L.CLTV > 100 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0171) (0.0113)
L.CLTV 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0117 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.0182∗ 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0139
(0.0113) (0.00957) (0.0134) (0.0103) (0.0221) (0.0185)
∆ CLTV 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.00668 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.00618
(0.0194) (0.0175) (0.0194) (0.0174)
L.Negative Equity 0.00210 0.00550
(0.0216) (0.0187)
L.DSR 0.233∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0387) (0.0490) (0.0417) (0.0517) (0.0438) (0.0519) (0.0441)
∆ DSR 0.239∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0475) (0.0570) (0.0478) (0.0601) (0.0479) (0.0601) (0.0479)
Observations 4,749 4,239 4,749 4,239 4,316 3,861 4,316 3,861
Mortgage arrears is deﬁned as being unable to make a mortgage repayment in the last 12 months, due to ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. Regressions also include loan vintage, household characteristics (age, marital status, education, house-
hold composition, region), regional macro variables, employment status and income. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In Table 6 we perform a number of additional robustness checks. Our baseline re-
gressions show that households with children, either single or double parent households,
are associated with a higher likelihood of delinquency (see Table 13 in the Appendix). In
columns 1 and 2 we therefore replace the log of real household income with the log of real
equivalised household income, which gives each household member a weighting to account
for the composition of the household. The coeﬃcients on equivalised income are very sim-
ilar to those on income in the baseline models, while the coeﬃcients on other key variables
remain unchanged.
In our baseline speciﬁcation we included the NUTS3 regional unemployment rate, GVA
growth and GDP per capita to capture macroeconomic variation and business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations at the regional level. However, we may still have concerns over omitted variable
bias. In columns 3 and 4 we therefore replace the time varying regional macroeconomic
controls with region year ﬁxed eﬀects which capture all regional variation over time. The
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stocks Flows Stocks Flows Stocks Flows
L.CLTV < 80 (Base Group) - - - - - -
L.CLTV 80− 100 0.0217 0.00327 0.0184 -0.00371 0.0148 0.00286
(0.0185) (0.0132) (0.0187) (0.0148) (0.0178) (0.0129)
L.CLTV > 100 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0163 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.00431 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0198
(0.0176) (0.0117) (0.0183) (0.0134) (0.0174) (0.0124)
Employed (Base Group) - - - - - -
Unemployed 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0627∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0296) (0.0314) (0.0345) (0.0318) (0.0304)
Other 0.0497∗∗∗ 0.0187 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0201 0.0581∗∗∗ 0.0217
(0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0153) (0.0172) (0.0140)
L.Log Real HH Income -0.0613∗∗∗ -0.0210 -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0163
(0.0140) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0112)
L.Debt Service Ratio 0.216∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗
(0.0492) (0.0392) (0.0501) (0.0479) (0.0481) (0.0390)
∆ Debt Service Ratio 0.237∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.0588) (0.0480) (0.0619) (0.0571) (0.0576) (0.0474)
L.Log Real Equivalised HH Income -0.0713∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0101)
Mortgage originated 2003-2008 0.0149 -0.00910
(0.0134) (0.00961)
Mortgage top-up 0.0381∗∗ 0.0192
(0.0152) (0.0135)
Loan Vintage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Macro Controls Y Y N N Y Y
Region*Year FE N N Y Y N N
Observations 4,735 4,226 4,333 3,289 4,749 4,239
Mortgage arrears is deﬁned as being unable to make a mortgage repayment in the last 12 months, due to ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. Regressions also include loan vintage, household characteristics (age, marital status, education, house-
hold composition, region), regional macro variables, employment status and income. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
coeﬃcients on our key variables of interest remain unchanged. Finally, in columns 5 and 6
we include two variables to control for legacy eﬀects of the crisis in our data. The ﬁrst is a
control for whether the mortgage was originated during the pre-crisis boom years 2003-2008
when underwriting practices in the banking sector loosened markedly and households bor-
rowed large volumes of credit at high loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios. The second
is an indicator variable which controls for whether the mortgage has been topped-up. We
observe that having topped up a mortgage is associated with a higher stock of mortgage
arrears, but neither of these variables have any eﬀect on the transition into delinquency.
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5 Exploring the Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks
at the Borrower Level
5.1 Transmission Mechanism and Scenario Design
In this section we use the empirical estimates from the arrears model presented in Section 4
to examine the implications for Irish households of a possible increase in mortgage interest
rates. Despite the decline in cases of arrears in recent quarters, continued vulnerabilities
remain given the indebted nature of many households. These policy scenarios provide a
stress test of households' ability to cope with mortgage repayment increases that would
be associated with any policy rate rise. As we observe both the monthly payment that
households face, and their monthly net income, we can directly measure how an increase
in interest rates would change their repayment capacity. We can then map this through to
arrears using the estimated parameters from our benchmark model in Section 4.
In order to test the sensitivity of Irish mortgage holders to interest rate changes, we
use the ﬂows model presented in column 12 of Table 3. We focus on the ﬂows model for
two reasons. First, we are interested in households who transition into arrears and second,
the stock of households in arrears is aﬀected by both households transitioning into and
out of arrears. However, we do not have information on cured loans in our SILC dataset.
The analysis conducted in Section 4 focuses on the entire period for which SILC data are
available, 2004-2016. However, due to the huge systemic crisis that occurred in 2007/08,
we may expect that the parameters on key determinants of mortgage arrears may have
changed over time. In Table 7 we show that this is indeed the case; the coeﬃcients on
both the Debt Service Ratio and particularly ∆DSR are higher in the post-crisis period
(columns 3 and 4) compared to the entire 2004-2016 period (columns 1 and 2). For the
purposes of testing the sensitivity of Irish mortgage holders to potential future changes
in interest rates, we therefore focus on the post crisis period 2010-2016 only, to ensure
that the parameters reﬂect the most recent period in order to provide the most accurate
predictions. Further insights on why parameters might diﬀer between periods of systemic
crisis and more normal economic conditions are provided in O'Toole and Slaymaker (2019).
Table 7: Full Sample and Post Crisis Sample Analysis
(1) (2)
Full Sample Post-Crisis Only
Flows Flows
L.DSR 0.100∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0606)
∆ DSR 0.122∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0700)
Observations 4,239 2,439
Our simulation procedure is as follows. First, we use the model to calculate a baseline
predicted probability of arrears for each borrower. This is a function of all of the charac-
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teristics in the regression presented in column 12 of Table 3. We then use the amortisation
formula shown in equation 5 to increase the interest rate for each household and calculate
a new instalment9. The payment for each scenario, s, is then a function of the shocked
interest rate, the borrower's mortgage term, and the original loan amount.10 An impor-
tant aspect of passing the shock through to borrowers is the fact that the interest rate is
non-linear in the term and balance through the amortisation formula.
Payments = OriginalLoanBalance ∗ rs(1 + rs)
τ
((1 + rs)τ )− 1 (5)
In equation 5, s relates to the scenario, τ the original term of the mortgage and the
original loan balance is as reported. Once the new payment has been calculated, we can
then re-calculate the DSR with the shocked payment value:
DSRs =
Payments
NetIncome
(6)
The re-calculated DSRs are then combined with the values of other controls, and the
estimated parameters from the logit speciﬁcation, to estimate a new predicted probability
of arrears for each household, i in year t.
̂Pr(Dsit = 1) = f(∆̂DSRsit, DSRsit−1, controls) (7)
We then take the mean predicted probability of arrears across all households in each
year, and compare this to the baseline mean to quantify the increase in the average pre-
dicted probability of arrears.
Deviation =
∑n
i=1
̂Pr(Dsit = 1)
n
−
∑n
i=1 Pr(Dit = 1)
n
(8)
9As our SILC dataset only reports an average annual interest rate, we use an amortisation
formula and information on the originating loan amount, monthly mortgage payment and original
mortgage term to solve for a household speciﬁc interest rate which we then shock under each of
our six interest rate scenarios. Due to missing instalment data for tracker mortgages in SILC, we
use an average quarterly tracker rate, calculated by adding a 1.35 per cent mark-up to the base
rate, and then use the amortisation formula and information on the loan amount and mortgage
term to calculate the monthly instalment. The mark up 1.35 is derived from using the average
tracker rate on all loans from Kelly et al. (2015) Table 4 minus the average policy rate for 2015.
10One limitation of our approach is that, in SILC, we do not have information on modiﬁed
loan amounts if arrears have been capitalised or if a portion of the capital warehoused. This may
break the link between originating features of the loan and the current payment and add some
additional uncertainty to the magnitude of our shocks. Furthermore, we do not have information
on equity release balances but households who have these products may report the component of
the payment for these products in the monthly instalment. This would lower the solved interest
rate in our analysis and lead to a lower probability of default for these households than if we had
this information. Our estimates should be seen as a lower bound in this case.
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One important aspect of the Irish market that represents a potential vulnerability is
the diﬀerence in arrears sensitivity by the type of mortgage interest rate held, and how
any policy rate changes would be passed through to borrowers. The vast majority (ap-
proximately 85 per cent) of Irish mortgages are variable rate and these can be classiﬁed as
either tracker, where the rate tracks the ECB base rate at an agreed margin or standard
variable rate (SVR), where the SVR lender oﬀers no speciﬁc link to an underlying marker
or wholesale rate. Crucially, the lender can increase or decrease the rate at its discretion.
Irish lenders stopped oﬀering tracker mortgage rates in 2009, when the underlying prof-
itability risk inherent in such products became evident due to the increased funding costs
from interbank rates such as the Euribor. Since then all variable rates oﬀered in the Irish
market have been standard variable in nature. In our sample we observe 16 per cent of
mortgages being on ﬁxed rates, 59 per cent are SVR and 25 per cent are on tracker rates11.
We conduct three interest rate shocks: 25, 50 and 100 basis points. Each of these
scenarios are conducted under the assumptions of both full pass through for all interest
rate types and then with a diﬀerential pass through to reﬂect the diﬀerent interest rate types
across the Irish mortgage market. We use this range of values between 25-100 basis points
for several reasons. First, ECB policy makers have recently pointed towards a gradual
removal of the extraordinary monetary accommodation and a potential normalisation of
policy rates. During a speech to the ECB Forum on Central Banking in June 2018, Mario
Draghi stated that the ECB will remain patient in determining the timing of the ﬁrst
rate rise and will take a gradual approach to adjusting policy thereafter. We therefore
begin with a very small 25 basis point increment. Second, however, it is important to
remember that as our model is annual, it is plausible that we may see a number of small
incremental increases over the course of one year, which could add up to a 50 or 100 basis
point increase.
In the scenarios with the diﬀerential pass through, we make a number of technical
working assumptions. For ﬁxed rate mortgages, there is no eﬀect, while the full eﬀect
passes through to the tracker mortgages. For the SVR, the issue is complicated due to
the breakdown in the pass-through relationship, which has been observed in the Irish
market since 2013. Both Goggin et al. (2012) and McQuinn and Morley (2015) examine
the breakdown in the pass through relationship in the Irish mortgage market. Amongst
other reasons, both studies cite the decline in competition in the Irish mortgage market
post 2008 as a reason for this. We take a pass-through coeﬃcient of 0.6, which is estimated
from McQuinn and Morley (2015). Using a panel dataset, McQuinn and Morley (2015)
estimate the pass-through relationship for Irish credit institutions over the period 1999-
2008, the period just before the breakdown in the transmission mechanism. For these
ﬁnal two scenarios with diﬀerent pass-through, we calculate the predicted probabilities of
arrears on the smaller 2013-2016 sample only as the breakdown of SVR and tracker rates
11In our SILC data variable rate mortgages are only split into SVR and trackers from 2013
onwards. Prior to this mortgages have been classiﬁed simply as ﬁxed or variable (including trackers)
rate.
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is not available in our data prior to 2013.
Table 8: Mean Mortgage Payment and DSRs under Interest Rate Shock Scenarios
2010-2016 2013-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Fixed SVR Tracker
Base Payment 873 884.22 870.18 968.07
DSR 0.1885 0.2008 0.1929 0.1871
Shock 25 bps Payment 971.96 884.22 961.44 1031.08
DSR 0.1989 0.2008 0.1987 0.1982
Shock 50 bps Payment 1022.32 884.22 990.87 1090.7
DSR 0.2096 0.2008 0.2052 0.2093
Shock 100 bps Payment 1127.27 884.22 1051.26 1215.33
DSR 0.232 0.2008 0.2183 0.2329
No. Obs. 2439 266 950 411
5.2 Scenario Outcomes
To begin, we summarise the resulting impacts on the monthly mortgage payment and the
DSR under the three diﬀerent scenarios (Table 8). In column (1) we present the shocks for
the full sample with no diﬀerential pass through. In columns (2)-(4), where the data are
available on the contract types, we disaggregate the impacts. For the full shocks, the debt
service ratio increases from a mean of just under 19 per cent in the baseline to just under
20 per cent (just over 23 per cent) under the 25 basis points shock (100 basis points). In
the rate type shock, the payment and the DSR are unaﬀected for the ﬁxed rate mortgages,
while the eﬀect is larger for the tracker category than the SVRs.
Figure 7: Deviations from Baseline Predicted Probability of Arrears under Interest
Rate Shock Scenarios
(a) All
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In Figure 7 the implications of the interest rate shock scenarios on the predicted prob-
abilities of arrears are plotted with respect to the baseline level predicted by the original
model. The associated probabilities are presented in full in Table 9. The baseline model
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predicts a transitions into arrears rate of 2.66 per cent in 2016. Using CBI loan-level data,
Figure 3b in McCann (2017) shows an approximately 1.5 per cent six monthly ﬂow of
mortgages into any days arrears, indicating that the annual predicted probability of 2.66
per cent predicted by our transitions model is a close ﬁt with the actual data.
Figure 7b shows that for 2016, a 100 basis point increase in the policy rate (with the
diﬀering impacts on the three diﬀerent mortgage rate types) would increase the probability
of arrears by approximately 0.5 percentage points. This would represent an increase in the
rate of arrears ﬂows of 18 per cent. A smaller 50 basis point increase with diﬀering pass-
through would increase the probability of arrears by 0.2 percentage points, an increase of
8 per cent in the ﬂow, while a 25 basis point would increase the probability of arrears by
0.1 percentage points, an increase of 4 per cent in the ﬂow. In all three cases 25 per cent of
the mortgage market would observe the full increase in the policy rate (tracker), while 60
per cent of the market would experience 60 per cent of the increase (SVR). The ﬁxed rate
customers would not witness any eﬀect on their DSR and consequently the probability of
arrears. One potential concern with our SILC data is the accuracy of reported outstanding
balances and monthly mortgage payments, and therefore our ability to accurately calculate
an interest rate for those households who have topped up their mortgage. To address these
concerns we perform a robustness check in which we remove households who have topped up
their mortgage. The results remain similar and are reported in Table 14 in the Appendix.
Table 9: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Mortgage Arrears Under Interest Rate
Shock Scenarios
Year Baseline Predicted Interest Rate Shock
Probability 25bps 50bps 100bps No. Obs.
Equal Shock for All
2010 0.0687 0.0728 0.0766 0.0850 318
2011 0.0760 0.0799 0.0841 0.0935 227
2012 0.0630 0.0664 0.0702 0.0789 267
2013 0.0552 0.0585 0.0622 0.0707 369
2014 0.0489 0.0519 0.0552 0.0629 317
2015 0.0429 0.0454 0.0482 0.0545 490
2016 0.0266 0.0282 0.0300 0.0342 451
Diﬀerential Pass Through
2013 0.0552 0.0570 0.0590 0.0635 369
2014 0.0489 0.0509 0.0531 0.0582 317
2015 0.0429 0.0444 0.0461 0.0499 490
2016 0.0266 0.0276 0.0288 0.0313 451
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5.3 Will an Improving Economy Provide any Oﬀset?
In our initial interest rate simulation scenarios presented in Section 5.2, we focus on the
partial equilibrium eﬀects of a rise in interest rates on the ﬂow of households falling into
mortgage arrears in isolation, keeping all other factors constant. However, it is likely
that in an environment where interest rates are rising, that incomes will also be rising,
which could therefore potentially oﬀset part of the eﬀect on the arrears rate from increased
interest rates.
In order to examine whether taking into account the general equilibrium eﬀects of
higher income growth could oﬀset the eﬀects of a rise in interest rates, we use data on
personal disposable income from 1970-2017 provided by the Central Statistics Oﬃce to
calculate an average income growth ﬁgure of 3.8% a year. However, a rise in interest rates
is likely to lead to lower income growth. In order to address this, we use COSMO, the
Core Structural Model of the Irish Economy12, to test how sensitive income growth is to
an interest rate hike and we then moderate the income rise by the sensitivity of income
to the policy rate. This results in an annual income growth rate ranging from 3.6-3.7%
depending on the magnitude of the interest rate shock.13
In Table 10 we present the predicted probabilities of arrears from our model under the
three interest rate shock scenarios with accompanying income growth. Comparing these
probabilities with the partial equilibrium interest rate shocks presented in Table 9, we show
that a rise in household income will do little to oﬀset the eﬀects of a rise in interest rates.
For example, for a 50 basis point increase in the interest rate in 2016, our model predicts an
arrears ﬂow rate of 2.76%, only marginally lower than the ﬁgure of 2.88% predicted in the
scenario without any rise in incomes. Our results show that in a highly indebted economy
such as Ireland, even fairly substantial income growth would not oﬀset or compensate for
the additional stress on Irish households resulting from a rise in interest rates.
Table 10: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Mortgage Arrears Under Interest Rate
Shock Scenarios with Rising Incomes
Year Baseline Predicted Interest Rate Shock
Probability 25bps 50bps 100bps No. Obs.
2013 0.0552 0.0548 0.0567 0.0608 369
2014 0.0489 0.0488 0.0509 0.0557 317
2015 0.0429 0.0428 0.0444 0.0479 490
2016 0.0266 0.0266 0.0276 0.0300 451
Income growth ﬁgures are based on the long run average of CSO personal disposable
income data 1970-2017 moderated by COSMO estimates of the sensitivity of income
to the policy rate. Income growth of 3.7% under a 25bps or 50bps interest rate shock
and 3.6% for 100bps.
To better understand why an increase in household income does not oﬀset the eﬀects
of higher interest rates, in Table 11 we take a closer look at what happens to the two
12see Bergin et al. (2017) for an overview
13For robustness we present results using lower income growth equivalent to the interest rate
rise in Table 15 in the Appendix.
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components of the debt service ratio, mortgage payments and incomes. Taking the 50
basis point interest rate shock for example, the mean payment for a household on a tracker
mortgage would rise from e968 to e1091, an increase of 13%. This means that because
incomes increase by a much smaller 3.7%, the increase in the DSR is approximately 8%.
For a household on an SVR mortgage a 50bps interest rate shock would increase the DSR
by 2.5%. Households with a ﬁxed rate mortgage would see their DSR fall as their payments
remain unchanged and their incomes rise, but as variable rate mortgages (tracker and SVR)
make up approximately 85% of the Irish mortgage market, this has little impact on the
overall predicted arrears rate. It must be noted that in Table 11 the ﬁgures presented
are mean values for each series. Furthermore, the DSR means are not replicable using a
simple amortisation formula. The ﬁgures presented are the averages from the distribution
of the debt service ratio before and after the shocks. These average ﬁgures depend on the
shape of the underlying distribution which in turn depend on the distribution of each of the
components. In this case, the distribution is a function of interest rates, terms, mortgage
balances and incomes. The average of the ratio for these ﬁgures does not therefore add to
the ratio of the averages. For example dividing the average payment by the average net
income will not provide the average DSR.
Table 11: Mean Mortgage Payment and DSRs under Interest Rate Shock Scenarios
with Rising Incomes
Long Run Trend Income Rise
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed SVR Tracker
Base Payment 884.22 870.18 968.07
Income 4751.56 5048.40 5757.06
DSR 0.2008 0.1929 0.1871
25 bps Payment 884.22 961.44 1031.08
Income 4927.37 5235.19 5970.07
DSR 0.1936 0.1916 0.1911
50 bps Payment 884.22 990.87 1090.7
Income 4927.37 5235.19 5970.07
DSR 0.1936 0.1978 0.2018
100 bps Payment 884.22 1051.26 1215.33
Income 4922.62 5230.14 5964.31
DSR 0.1938 0.2107 0.2248
No. Observations 266 950 411
Payment and income reported as monthly Euro values.
5.4 Understanding Heterogeneous Policy Impacts
Having established in the previous section that increasing household incomes do little
to oﬀset the impacts of rate increases, in this section we turn to exploring the distribu-
tional consequences of monetary policy normalisation across households. In previous work
analysing the default behaviour of Spanish households, Aller and Grant (2018) show that
particular households such as the younger and less educated are more likely to default. In
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this section we examine which types of households are most at risk of falling into arrears
on their mortgage payments as a result of a rise in interest rates due to monetary policy
normalisation.
Table 12: Socio-economic Characteristics of Households by the Severity of Impact
of an Interest Rate Shock
∆ Predicted Probability
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Marital Status
Married 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.70
Single 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.24
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06
Age Group
18-35 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.35
36-50 0.61 0.77 0.68 0.51
>50 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.14
Employment Status
Employed 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.69
Unemployed 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05
Other 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.26
Education
Primary 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
Secondary 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.36
Tertiary 0.63 0.70 0.73 0.60
Household Composition
No children 0.56 0.45 0.38 0.32
Children 0.44 0.55 0.62 0.68
1 adult 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
2+ adults 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86
Income Distribution
Q1 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07
Q2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.18
Q3 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.40
Q4 0.63 0.69 0.64 0.35
Region
BMW 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.18
Dublin 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.20
ME MW SE SW 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.62
Vintage
<10 years 0.45 0.41 0.49 0.61
≥10 years 0.55 0.59 0.51 0.39
No. Obs. 358 358 358 358
We calculate the increase in predicted probability of ar-
rears for each household and split the sample into quar-
tiles (Q1 least severe - Q4 most severe) and then report
the share of households by socio-economic groups for each
quartile of ∆ predicted probability of arrears.
To perform the interest rate shock simulations, we ﬁrst estimate a baseline predicted
probability of arrears and then shock the interest rate and re-calculate a new DSR. The
re-calculated DSRs are then combined with the values of other controls, and the estimated
parameters from the logit speciﬁcation, to estimate a new predicted probability of arrears
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for each household, i in year t. This enables us to calculate the increase in the predicted
probability of arrears for each household and to split these households into quartiles. This
gives us a measure of the severity of the increased probability of falling into arrears, with
households in Q1 facing the least severe increase in predicted probability of arrears, and
those in Q4 facing the most severe impact. In Table 12, using a 50 basis point increase in
the interest rate, we examine the share of households in each of these four quartiles by a
series of socio-economic characteristics in order to identify which types of households are
most vulnerable to a policy rate rise.
Several key ﬁndings emerge from Table 12. One of the most striking ﬁndings is that
the 35 per cent share of young households, those aged 18-35, in Q4 is at least double that
in any of the other quartiles, suggesting that young households are likely to be particularly
vulnerable to a rise in interest rates. Turning to the income distribution, we see that in
general the majority of mortgage holders are typically found in the top quartile of the
income distribution, with the share roughly between 60-70 per cent. However, for those
most aﬀected by the interest rate shock, Q4, this share falls to 35 per cent, with these
Q4 households over-represented in all of the lower quartiles of the income distribution. In
terms of household composition, there appears to be little diﬀerence across one and two
adult households, but households most vulnerable to an interest rate rise are more likely to
have children. We also observe a higher share of households in Q4 with a loan vintage of
fewer than ten years. However, drawing any conclusions from loan vintage is complicated
due to the large number of bad loans issued under loose credit conditions in the early
to mid 2000s. In Table 16 in the Appendix we explore the issue of loan vintage further
and show that households with a loan vintage>10 years actually have a higher predicted
probability of arrears, but that households with a loan vintage<10 years see the largest
increases in their predicted probability of arrears under an interest rate shock. This is
consistent with our ﬁnding that younger households are particularly vulnerable to a rise
in interest rates.
Taken together, the ﬁndings on age and a household's position in the income distri-
bution are consistent with a life cycle earnings explanation. Younger households at the
beginning of their careers, would likely expect to see their incomes rise in the future, but
are likely to currently face higher debt service ratios than an older household which may
have seen their debt service ratio decrease through time as a result of rising income. This
results in younger households having less capacity to absorb any potential rise in their debt
service ratio as a result of a policy rate rise.
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we use detailed household survey data for Ireland to assess the link between
mortgage repayment capacity and arrears. Given the scale of the Irish mortgage market
diﬃculties in recent times, understanding the channels through which vulnerabilities may
arise in the market is of considerable importance for ﬁnancial stability policy.
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The high level of indebtedness across Irish households, and the particular interest rate
type structure which contains vulnerable tracker borrowers and a high share of variable
rate mortgages, leaves speciﬁc exposures in the Irish market to potential interest rate
reversals. Given the current low interest rate environment, many Irish households, in
particular tracker borrowers have beneﬁted considerably from lower rates. However, any
potential monetary policy normalisation scenario would certainly higher their repayment
burden and reduce their repayment capacity.
Using an empirical model designed to capture current repayment shocks, we test the
impact of a range of monetary policy normalisation scenarios on the predicted probability
of mortgage arrears for Irish households. We conduct three interest rate shocks: 25, 50 and
100 basis points. Each of these scenarios are conducted under the assumptions of both full
pass through for all interest rate types and then with a diﬀerential pass through to reﬂect
the diﬀerent interest rate types across the Irish mortgage market.
Our estimates of the percentage point increase in the arrears ﬂow of Irish mortgages
range from 0.1 percentage points for a 25 basis points shock to 0.5 percentage points for
a 100 basis points shock with diﬀerential pass through. Taking the middle ground of a
50 basis point shock, for 2016 our estimates show a 0.2 percentage point (8 per cent)
increase under diﬀerential pass through, and a 0.34 percentage point (13 per cent) increase
in the arrears ﬂow for a shock applied equally to all households. The relative variance
in the estimates reﬂects the non-linear nature of the impact of interest rates as well as
the uncertainty about the sensitivity of lending rates to changes in the policy rate for
non-tracker borrowers. We also ﬁnd that even fairly substantial income growth would not
oﬀset or compensate for the additional stress on Irish households resulting from a rise in
interest rates because even a moderate rise in the policy rate causes mortgage instalments
to rise far more sharply than incomes, causing a deterioration in the debt service ratio.
Naturally, rising incomes would be supported by a falling unemployment rate and rising
house prices which would further result in lower arrears in a recovering economy but the
point remains that debt-service burdens are more sensitive to rate changes than income
changes. Finally, we explore the heterogeneous exposure of the shocks across households
and ﬁnd that in particular young households, low income households and those early in the
loan age distribution are most at risk of falling into arrears on their mortgage payments as
a result of a rise in interest rates.
A number of implications for policy stand out. First, the inevitable monetary policy
normalisation that will occur in the medium term poses considerable risk for Irish house-
holds and a continued deleveraging process for those with legacy debts is prudent. Second,
the scale of the impact on mortgage arrears is large due to the non-linear relationship
between interest rates and repayment diﬃculties. In this regard, increases in the policy
rate will be compounding and the impact will increase over time, ceteris paribus. Third,
the scenarios highlight the precarious nature of repayment burdens for non-ﬁxed rate bor-
rowers, particularly younger and low income borrowers. Expanding the share of ﬁxed rate
loans in the Irish market and the length of the ﬁxed term would provide more stability,
30
Monetary Policy Normalisation and Arrears
certainty and security in future, by limiting these at risk groups' exposure to policy rate
changes.
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7 Appendix
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Table 13: Baseline Results - Additional Covariates
(1) (2)
Stocks Flows
L.Unemployment Rate 0.838∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.148)
L.GVA Growth -0.109∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.0554) (0.0474)
L.Log GDP per capita 0.0769 0.0785
(0.0597) (0.0509)
18-35
36-50 -0.0219 -0.0225∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0110)
>50 0.00296 -0.00998
(0.0232) (0.0175)
Married
Single 0.0161 0.00491
(0.0176) (0.0161)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced 0.0623∗∗ 0.00717
(0.0249) (0.0160)
Primary
Secondary -0.0152 -0.0116
(0.0234) (0.0225)
Tertiary -0.0235 -0.0185
(0.0239) (0.0232)
1 adult, no children
1 adult, 1+ children 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0318
(0.0371) (0.0227)
2+ adults, no children 0.0329∗∗ 0.0112
(0.0148) (0.00942)
2+ adults, 1+ children 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0132)
L.CLTV < 80
L.CLTV 80− 100 0.0173 0.00204
(0.0179) (0.0129)
L.CLTV > 100 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0171) (0.0113)
Employed
Unemployed 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0308)
Other 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0211
(0.0174) (0.0141)
L.Log Real HH Income -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0124
(0.0137) (0.0103)
L.Debt Service Ratio 0.233∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0387)
∆ Debt Service Ratio 0.239∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0475)
Observations 4,749 4,239
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Table 14: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Mortgage Arrears Under Interest Rate
Shock Scenarios Excluding Households with Mortgage Top-ups
Year Baseline Predicted Interest Rate Shock
Probability 25bps 50bps 100bps No. Obs.
2014 0.0512 0.0531 0.0554 0.0605 235
2015 0.0454 0.0470 0.0489 0.0532 373
2016 0.0276 0.0287 0.0299 0.0327 354
Table 15: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Mortgage Arrears Under Interest Rate
Shock Scenarios with Equivalent Rise in Incomes
Year Baseline Predicted Interest Rate Shock
Probability 25bps 50bps 100bps No. Obs.
2014 0.0489 0.0507 0.0528 0.0574 317
2015 0.0429 0.0443 0.0459 0.0493 490
2016 0.0266 0.0276 0.0286 0.0309 451
Income growth equivalent to interest rate shock i.e. a 25bps increase in the interest
rate is accompanied by a 25bps increase in income.
Table 16: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Mortgage Arrears Under Interest Rate
Shock Scenarios by Loan Vintage
Year Baseline Predicted Interest Rate Shock
Probability 25bps 50bps 100bps No. Obs.
Loan Vintage < 10years
2014 0.0549 0.0575 0.0602 0.0665 165
2015 0.0402 0.0420 0.0439 0.0483 203
2016 0.0232 0.0243 0.0254 0.0282 151
Loan Vintage >= 10years
2014 0.0408 0.0420 0.0435 0.0469 152
2015 0.0453 0.0466 0.0481 0.0513 287
2016 0.0288 0.0298 0.0309 0.0332 300
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